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STATE~fENT OF FACTS 
On November 8, 1956, the Board 'Of Commissioners 
of Salt Lake City passed .an ordinance which, as amended 
on November 15, 1956, reads as follows: 
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"Section 32-2-1. PROHIBITION OF BAGA-
TEijLE, P I N B A L L AND MARBLE MA-
CHINES, ETC. It shall be unlawful for any per-
son, firm or corporation or any other group or 
association of individuals however styled or desig-
nated, to keep, use, maintain, possess, permit, al-
}ow,.or hiVe un<Ie'r control, or p1ake av.ailableill 
.any store or place of business or establishllieilt 
in which the public may enter or be upon, or in 
any other place of public resort, or in any place 
of business, club, association, or establishment 
where without warrant the right of direct police 
inspection exists within the corporate limits of 
S~alt Lake City, either as owner, bailee, lessee, 
agent, employee, mortgagee or otherwise, any of 
the following where the operation, use or play of 
which is controlled or set in operation by the de-
posit of any coin, plate, disk, plug, key or other 
subject or by the payment of any fee or charge: 
" (a) Any game of bagatelle, pigeonhole or 
device or contrivance commonly known 
as pin game, pin ball game, marble, 
one shot marble game ; 
"(b) Any game, device, contrivance or ma-
chine which contains a pay-off or .award 
device or meehanisn1 for the return of 
1noney, coins, slugs, ehecks, credit, 
tokens or for the deliYery of anything 
of value or representing or exchange-
able or redee1nnble for anything of 
value : provided, that this section shall 
not rover the iten1s included in Section 
~ of this ordinance . 
.. Section 32-~-~. EXCLlTSIONS. The pro-
visions of this ordinance shall not apply to Ina-
chines, deviees, or contrivances "Thieh are used, 
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operated or maintained exclusively for the pur-
pose of dispensing and sale of merchandise or 
producing mu.sic or providing rides or showing 
of pictures. 
"Section 32-2-3. PENALTY. Any person 
violating any provisions of this ordi.."'tance is 
guilty of a misde.meanor and upon conviction 
thereof shall be punished by a fine not more than 
T·wo Hundred Ninety Nine and 00/100 Dollars 
($299.00) or by imprisonment in the County Jail 
not to exceed six (6) months, or both such fine 
and imprisonment. 
"Section 32-2-4. LICENSE NO DEFENSE. 
The fact that any machine, table, device, game 
or contrivance mentioned in this ordinance may 
have been licensed under the licensing authorities 
or that a tax for the operation thereof may have 
been paid, shall constitute no defense to any action 
or prosecution brought under the provisions of 
ihis ordinance. 
"Section 32-2-5. SEPARABILITY CLAUSE. 
It is the intention of the Board of Commissioners 
of Salt Lake City thrut each separate provision 
of each section of this ordinance shall be deemed 
independent of all other provisions of said sec-
tions and of each of them and it is further the 
intention of the Board of Commissioners of Salt 
Lake City that if any provision of said sections 
or any of them be declared invalid for any pur-
pose or application, all other provisions thereof 
shall remain valid and enforceable. 
"Section 32-2-6. REVOCATION OF LI-
C'ENSE. The Board of Commissioners ·of Salt 
Lake City m.ay revoke any type of license of any 
licensee issued by Salt Lake City for any viola-
tion of this ordinance by such licensee. 
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"Section 32-2-7. All ordinances or parts of 
ordinances in conflict herewith are hereby re-
pealed.'' 
Subsequent to the enactment of this ordinance and 
before its scheduled effective date, the District Court 
of Salt Lake County on December 27, 1956, entered a 
temporary restraining order against enforcement of the 
ordinance and an order to show cause why defendants 
should not be permanently enjoined from the enforce-
ment of the ordinance. 
On January 10, 1957 the District Court entered its 
decision holding the ordinance invalid. The final para-
graph of the Court'.s decision reads as follows: 
"It would seem that the ordinance in question 
goes beyond that involved in the Lawrence case 
and goes beyond the power conferred upon the 
city by the Legislature, and it is the decision of 
this court that the ordinance referred to above 
is unconstitutional." 
The judg1nent dated January 25, 1957 reads in part 
af' follo"?s: 
"'. . . that Chapter 2, as amended, of Title 
;~~ of the ReYised Ordinances of Salt Lake City 
1955 goes beyond the power conferred upon Salt 
T .~a kP Cit~· hy il1e Legislature of the State of 
LTtah and that the said ordinance is ultra virus.'' 
BT .. :\TEl\IENT OF POINTS 
POINT 1. 
CHAPTER 2 OF TITLE 32 OF THE REVISED ORDIN-
ANCES OF SALT LAI~E CITY. 1955, DEALING WITH PIN-
BALL MACHINES AND OTHER SIMILAR DEVICES, CON-
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STITUTES A VALID EXERCISE OF THE POLICE POWER 
OF SALT LAKE CITY AND IS NOT VIOLATE OF ·CON-
STITU'TIONAL DUE PROCESS. 
POINT 2. 
CHAPTER 2 OF TITLE 32 OF THE REVISED ORDIN-
ANCES OF SALT LAKE CITY, 1955, DEALING WITH PIN-
BALL MACHINES AND OTHER SIMILAR DEVICES, IS 
LAWFULLY WITHIN THE POWER CONFERRED UPON 
SALT LAKE CITY BY THE LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE 
OF UTAH. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT 1. 
CHAPTER 2 OF TITLE 32 OF THE REVISED ORDIN-
ANCES OF SALT LAKE CITY, 1955, DEALING WITH PIN-
BALL MACHINES AND OTHER SIMILAR DEVICES, CON-
STITUTES A VALID EXERCISE OF THE POLICE POWER 
OF SALT LAKE CITY AND IS N,OT VIOLATE OF ·CON-
STITUTIONAL DUE PROCESS. 
On a b.asis substantially the same, in terms of lan-
guage of the ordinance and devices suppressec\ as the 
ordinance no'v before the court, the authorities univers-
ally uphold .such an enactment on the theory that the 
prevalence of the devices, their tendency to foster the 
gambling instinct, their adaptability to gan1bling, and 
their known temptation to school children anrl minors, 
cons~titute .ample legal justification in curbing the ma-
chines by restrictive regulations. In 6 Jf cQuill,·n Mtttn i-
cipal Corporations, page 683, it is stated: 
" ... But as is well kno\vn, marble .and pin ball 
games and the like frequently are gambling de-
vices or readily converted into such by a mere 
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mechanical adjustment or by their use for wager-
ing. Snyder v. Alliance, 41 Ohio App. 48, 179 
N.E. 426; Coleman v. ·Chicago, 297 Ill. App. 130, 
17 N.E. (2d) 365; Baker v. City of LaFayette, 
202 Ga. 666, 44 S.E. (2d) 255. Consequently, it 
is not surprising that municip-al and state gaming 
legislation in many instances is directed at all 
such devices for 'skill' or 'pleasure' as well ~ 
at those which definitely are gaming devices. 
Woodward v. City of Lithonia, 191 Ga. 234, 11 
S.E. (2d) 476. It has been observed that ordinarily 
the evil or dangerous character of outlawed 
articles is clear and obvious, but the power to 
abate a nuisance by forbidding the possession 
of certain articles may be exercised with respect 
to articles which are entirely harmless when 
properly used or controlled. Dallmann v. Klu-
chesky, 229 Wis. 169, 282 N.W. 9. This is true 
with r·espect to marble, pin ball and other table 
or mechanical 'skill' or 'ple~ure' games, with 
respect to their potential use for gambling. Dall-
mann v. Kluchesh.··-y, 229 \V"is. 169, 282 N.\r. 9. 
Accordingly, under power to provide for the gov-
ernment and good order of the city, an ordinance 
prohibiting the possession of table games, basket-
ball machines and the like, "ithout regard to 
their actual use for grunbling purposes, is valid 
as protective of the "~eifare of the youth of the 
city. Dalln1ann v. Klurhesky, 229 ''Tis. 169, 282 
N.,V. 9. Thus, such an ordinanee prohibiting pin 
ball or silnilnr nu1chines for grunes of chanee or 
skill is not Yiolative of due process of la'Y as 
required by the federal 8Jld state constitutions. 
'Vood"~ard Y. City of Lithonia, 191 Ga. 234, 11 
S.E. (2d) -l-7G. Nor is such an ordinance void as 
unreasonable because its effect is to coinpletely 
destroy and confiscate the business 8Jld property 
of persons possessed of such n1achines at the tiine 
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of the enactment of the ordinance. Woodward 
v. City of Lithonia, 191 Ga. 234, 11 S.E. ( 2d) 
476." 
Other authorities are universally to the same effect 
as those supporting the law announced in the foregoing 
quotation. In the case of Columbus Legal Amusement 
Association v. City of Col~t1nbus, 79 N.E. 2d 915, it is 
stated at page 919, as follows: 
"The unrestricted and unregulated use of 
amusement device.s operated by coins or slugs, 
wherein there is a certain element of chance, even 
though not classified .as gambling devices, may 
reasonably present a question involving the public 
welfare or the public morals. It would not .seem 
necessary to develop this fact because it is com-
monly understood. 'The problem presented to the 
city is increased and made more difficult where 
there is presented in a limited space many such 
devices varying in type and allure, but all in-
tended to have .an appeal to the public, and espe-
cially the youth. Manifest .such devices may be 
innocent enough in themselves, or if properly 
supervised but if not regulated, may readily be 
the means of offending against public morals." 
Similarly, in the case of Savoy Vending Co., Inc. 
v. Valentine Police Co1nrnissioner of the City of N eu' 
York, 33 N.Y. Supp. 2d 324, the court states at page 327, 
as follows: 
"It is needless to burden this writing with a 
complete resume of what the answering affidavits 
contain. Two fundamental points, however, have 
been made patently and painfully clear. First, 
the sponsors of coin operated machines, invar-
iably, have not aimed to respect the law, but 
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rath,er to evade it, and second, the effects upon 
youth h-ave been evil. A few references will suf-
fice. The industry stimulates the gambling in-
stinct among young people and children of school 
age. Machines located in neighborhood candy and 
station~ery stores, in ice cream parlors and similar 
establishments attract patronage to these places, 
which become 'hang-outs' for children of all ages. 
Many of the devices are in locations within a 
block of public and parochial schools and are 
operated by pennies as well as nickels. It is hardly 
likely that the child who has no lack of opportuni-
ties for play and clean amusement is drawn from 
his healthy associations to squander lunch money 
and often hard earned spending money upon the 
play of coin-op·erated machines for mere amuse-
nlent. It is the lure and enticement of a hoped 
for but never realized easy gain. And there we 
have the beginning of a hold upon fancy and 
imagination that increases its demand, nutured by 
unsavory associates until, too late, the path of 
petty crime, juvenile delinquency and hardened 
criminality has claimed another victim." 
Ag.~1in, in the case of State Ex Rel. Green, Depu,ty 
Solicitor, ~+1 Ala. -!55, 3 So. 2d 27, the Supre1ne Court 
of .Alaha1na ~aid: 
"We think it clear enough fro1n the language 
of thi~ act, especially definition (d), that the la-\v 
1naking body deen1ed it nece.ssary to prohibit all 
such llUlchines .and devices 'vhich could be oper-
ated as n. gaJne of ehanee, regardless as to ""'hether 
t.hPrP 'ras a 'pa.y-off' or not~ in order to fully 
suppress the gau1bling evil. That this 'vas "'"ithin 
t.hP police povver of the State and violated no 
provision of the consti,tution, either State or 
Federal, is well den1onstra.ted in the Eccles ease, 
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supra, as well as in our own case of State Ex. 
Rei. Wilkinson v. Murphy, 237 Ala. 332, 186 So. 
487." 
Many additional authorities are to the same effect: 
J. L. Mttrphy v. People of the State of California, 225 
U.S. 623, 56 L. Ed. 1229; Woodward v. City of Lithonia, 
191 Ga. 23-J-, 11 S.E. 2d 476; Dall1nann v. Kluchesky, 
229 Wis. 169, 282 N.W. 9; State v. Wiley, 232 Iowa 443, 
3 N.W. 2d 620. 
It appears therefore that the Legislative bodies of 
various municipalities throughout the nation have seen 
fit to suppress these devices in a fashion similar to 
the ordinance of Salt Lake City. One particular very 
instructive and informative case treats virtually every 
contention raised by plaintiffs in their p·etition for an 
order to show cause. The California case of Ex Parte 
Lawrence, 55 Cal. App. 2d 491, 131 P. 2d 27, concerns 
an ordinance of Long Beach very similar to defendant's 
enactment. The language of the Long Beach ordinance 
follows: 
"Sec. 235.02. Possession of Certain Games 
Prohibited. It shall be unlawful for any person, 
finn or corporation to keep, maintain, possess 
or have under control in any place of business, 
or in any other place of public resort, either as 
owner, les.see, agent, employee, morgagee or other-
wise, any table game or device commonly known 
as a 'pin game,' 'pin ball game,' 'marble game,' 
'one shot marble game,' 'horse race machine,' 
claw, scoop or grab machine, or any automatic 
pay-off machine, the operation, use or play of 
which is controlled by placing therein any coin, 
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plate, disk, plug, key or other device, or by the 
payment of any fe-e." 
This well reasoned opinion of Ex Parte Lawrence, 
supra, is supported by appropriate citation of ample 
authority including the Supreme Court of the United 
States. A brief comparison bet,veen the allegation.s of 
plaintiffs' petition and the law announced in the Lawr-
ence case is appropriate. 
In Paragraph 4 of plaintiffs' petition it is contended 
specifically that the ordinance is not within the scope 
of the police po,ver. To this contention the California 
court said: 
"Such power is as broad as public welfare 
(State v. Mountain Timber Co., 75 Wash. 581, 
135 P. 645, L.R.A. 1917D, 10), is 'coextensive 
with the necessities of the situation' (In re Santos, 
88 c·a1. App. 691, 264 P. 281, 283) and all prop-
erty is subject to the proper exercise of the police 
power, as the Supreme Court declared in Ex 
parte Quong W o, 161 Cal. 220, 118 P. 714. Indeed 
it has been repeatedly held that a business lawful 
in itself is not so protected, even by the Four-
teenth A1nendn1ent, that it cannot be regulated 
out of bu.siness by the adoption of regulatory 
ordinances under the police powers. Such was 
the situation in the case of Ex parte ~Iurphy, 8 
Cal. App. ~40, 97 P. 199, "~here the city of South 
Pa8adena adopted .an ordinance prohibiting the 
1nn.in tenanee of poolroo1ns or billiard parlors for 
hi rP: nnd altl1ough the question "'as presented 
to the Supreme Court of the lTnited States, pe-
titionPr in that c.ase re·presenting that he w·as 
hPing legislated out of his business and being 
deprived of his property without due process of 
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law, no relief was afforded him, the highest court 
affirming the right of the local governing body 
to adopt the ordinance in question (Murphy v. 
State of California, 225 U.S. 623, 32 S. Ct. 697, 
56 L. Ed. 1229, 41 L.R.A., N.S., 153). Upon this 
proposition the Supreme Court of the state like-
wise has unequivocally declared itself that all 
property is held subject to the exercise of police 
power and that constitutional provisions against 
the imp.airment of contracts and the taking of 
property without due process of law have no 
application as against the right of duly consti-
tuted legislative bodies to regulate property in 
the proper exercise of the police powers. Odd 
Fellows' Cemetary Ass'n v. City and County of 
San Francisco, 140 Cal. 226, 73 P. 987; In re 
Zhizhuzza, 147 Cal. 328, 81 P. 955." 
In paragraph 6 of plaintiffs' petition it is contended 
that property is taken without due process of law and 
that the ordinance bears no relation to public health 
or morals. Again, in the Lawrence case the California 
court answered a similar contention, as follows : 
". . . Plainly, petitioner was bound to know 
that his activity in maintaining the games in 
question, "\vhile lawful in itself, i.e., not inter-
dicted by state or federal law, was yet subject 
to municipal regulatory measure.s within the scope 
of the police power conferred upon municipalities 
by the state Constitution and by statutory enact-
ments." 
" ... A similar enactment in Alabama en-
tirely prohibiting such machines was held by the 
Supreme Court of that stat.e to be within the 
lawful exercise of the police power (State ex rei. 
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Green v. One 5c Fifth Inning Baseball Machine, 
241 Ala. 455, 3 So. 2d 27); and as above pointed 
out, in Murphy v. State of California, 225 U.S. 
623, 32 S. Ct. 697, 56 L. Ed. 1229, 41 L.R.A., N.S., 
153, South Pasadena Municipal legislation pro-
hibiting poolhalls for hire as unlawful was up-
held by the Supreme Court of the United States. 
Similar regulatory ordinances without number 
have met with judicial approval. Even if the 
business regulated has not yet become injurious 
or offensive but in the sound discretion of the 
legislative body may become so, it is the proper 
subject of regulatory legislation. In re Pedrosian, 
124 Cal. App. 692, 13 P. 2d 389." 
The California court conclude_s "\Yith the statement 
th·at, "In fact, we have been pointed to no opinion holding 
such regulation unreasonable." 
The case of Bountiful City L". DeLuca, 77 l~tah 107, 
292 P. 194, involved an action to restrain defendants 
fro1n per1nitting goats to graze within 300 feet of a 
stream contrary to an ordinance p.assed under an en-
abling ~tatnte designed to giYe the city the po,ver to 
protect its \Yater shed fron1 pollution ..... :\fter judginent 
for the City~ on appeal tl1e case "\Yas reYersed. The 
Snprt>lllt\ Court held that the unla"\lfnl arts charged were 
not ~upport('d hy the t'Yidenre, but if the acts had been 
~o ~upportP(l tht' ease \\~ould haYe been affir1ned. The 
('011 rt r<'.n ~onPd that the defendants "\Yere doing eYery-
thing po~~ible to pr<:'Yent a pollution of the stream: 
that tiH' eit~~ ~hould haYe diYerted the "\Yater at a differ-
Pnt point, thus nYt'rting the problen1. The court said: 
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". . . that every one must use hi.s property 
so as not to unreasonably or lmnecessarily injure 
others, and that he holds his p~roperty and the 
use and enjoyment of it subject to a reasonable 
and lawful exercise of the police power and to 
such reasonable re.straints and regulations over 
it as the legislature within its governing and 
controlling power vested in it may deem neces-
sary and expedient to protect and promote public 
health, public safety, morals, and general welfare; 
that the state may without compensation regulate 
and restrain the use of private prop~erty when 
the health, safety, morals, or welfare of the public 
requires or demands it; ... " (Emphasis added) 
The Utah Court held further that the lawful exer-
cise of the police povver may deprive the owner of all 
profitable use of his property if it is injurious or perni-
cious to the public health or welfare. Thus, the Bountiful 
City case is, contrary to plaintiffs' position, substantial 
authority for upholding the subject enactment of Salt 
Lake City since that case involved a business which in 
no way has factors inherently of an injurious character 
to the health and welfare of the people as is the case 
here. Moreover, it is important to note that the Salt 
Lake City ordinance does not absolutely prohibit the 
possession and use of the variou.s devices, but rather 
the devices are suppressed only in places of public 
resort .and in those establishments where without warrant 
the right of direct police inspection exists. Hence, the 
ordinance is regulatory and is not an absolute pTohibi-
tion. This distinction is made clear in the California 
case of Ex Parte Lawrence, supra. 
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The case of Utah Manufact1trers Association v. 
Stewart, 82 Utah 198, 23 P. 2d 229, holds that a statute 
authorizing the Governor to designate exclu.sive ware-
houses for distribution of alcohol was a valid exercise 
of the police power. l\Ioreover, a statement by the court 
bears emphasis, as follows : 
"It is well settled that the courts will not 
declare an act of the Legislature unconstitutional 
unless it clearly and manifestly violates some pro-
vision of the state or Federal :c·onstitution. Every 
presumption will be indulged in favor of con-
stitutionality and every reasonable doubt resolved 
in favor of validity. State v. Packer Corporation, 
77 Utah 500, 297 P. 1013. When legislative action 
is within the scope of the police power, fairly 
debatable questions as to reasonableness, wis-
dom, or propriety are not for courts but for the 
Legislature. Standard Oil Co. v. Marysville, 279 
U.S. 582, 49 S. Ct. 430, 73 L. Ed. 856 ... " 
(Emphasis added) 
The underlined portion of the foregoing quotation 
we respectfully contend deprives the courts of all power 
to resolve any question "~ith respect to the \visdon1 or 
propriety of the ordinance. 
Oth~r Utah easc .. s should be called to the attention 
of the court. In State r. Briggs. 46 lTtah 2SS~ 146 P. 
261, thP SuprPine Court upheld a conYiction for haYing 
sold Jiquor in Yiola.tion of a local option statute. The 
rourt snid: 
". . . All the constitutional provisions, ho"T-
ever, respecting the rights of acquiring, posses-
sin<.,. and protecting p·roperty .. in \Yhatever terms 
t"' 
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expressed, must nevertheless be construed and 
applied in connection with the police power of 
the state, unless it is in express terms other-
wise provided in the Constitution itself ... " 
The recent Utah case of Candas et al. v. Board of 
Salt Lake County Commissioners, et al., 5 Utah 2d 1, 295 
P. 2d 829, upheld the validity of a county ordinance 
defining a nuisance a.s a place where dancing is p·ern1itted 
on premises licensed for the sale of beer. The language 
of Justice Worthen in a concurring opinion is of par-
ticular importance to the facts of this case. Justice 
Worthen said: 
"Every man who engages in a business which 
is considered as questionable -and which to a 
greater or less degree violates the social and 
moral standards espoused by a substantial part 
of society must do so faced with the possibility 
that the operation of such business is not one of 
absolute right, but one permitted and tolerated 
with some reservation." 
In the ease of Shaw v. Ore1n City, 117 Utah 288, 214 
P. 2d 888, the Supreme Court of Utah upheld an 
ordinance of Orer.a City prohibiting sale of beer art retail 
on Sunday. The court pointed out that the Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953, Title 10-8-84 confers upon a city the 
power to enact such ordinances and regulation "as are, 
necessary and proper to provide for the safety and 
preserve the health, and pro1note the prosperity, improve 
the morals, peace and good order, cornfort and conveni-
ence of the city and the inhabitants thereof .... " 
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l\Ioreover, the Supreme Court in the Sha'lo case 
reasoned that a specific enabling statute existed. Again 
in succeeding sections of this brief we vvill point out that 
Salt Lake City is acting under lawful authority granted 
by the Legislature. 
POINT 2. 
CHAPTER 2 OF TITLE 32 OF THE REVISED ORDIN-
ANCES OF SALT LAKE CITY, 1955, DEALING WITH PIN-
BALL MACHINES AND OTHER SIMILAR DEVICES, IS 
LAWFULLY WITHIN THE POWER CONFERRED UPON 
SALT LAKE CITY BY THE LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE 
OF UTAH. 
As indicated in the foregoing, the l~tah Code Anno-
tated, 1953, Title 10-8-84, confers upon cities the general 
powers to pass ordinances and regulations "such as are 
necessary and proper to provide for the s~t~~ and pre-
serve the health, and pro1note the prosperitv, improve 
the worals, ne.ace and good order, co1nfort and conveni-
ence of the city and the inhabitants thereof .... ~' In 
addition to this general grant of police po,ver "rhich is 
sufficient to sustain the subject ordinance no\v before the 
court, a particular and specific grant of po,ver exists in 
l · tah Code ..:\nnotated, 1953, Title 10-S--±0~ ,,~hich pro-
yjd~\s as follo\Ys: 
"ThPy 1nny license~ tax .. regulate and suppress 
hilliard, pooL ba~qatcllc. pigeonhole or otlzer tables 
or in1 p!cJucuts kept or used for siJnilar purposes.-"· 
( ]1~n1phnsis added.) 
'ro rprrtdn t(' the Yn rion8 1naehines .and deYices con-~ 
tninP<l in thf" ordinancP h~~ suppression in places of public 
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resort and in other places of busines_s or establishments 
vvhere vvithout warrant the right of direct police inspec-
tion exists, is a proper exercise of the povver conferred 
upon Salt Lake City by the Legislature of the State 
of Utah. The universal holding of the many authorities 
previously cited conclusively show that these machines 
may be entirely prohibited from the corporate limits of 
the legislative body. But here, as indicated in the fore-
going, the scope of the ordinance amounts to a mere 
suppression and not a complete prohibition in thart the 
1nachines are generally proscribed only in places of pub-
lic resort. In the California ca:se of Ex Parte Lawrence, 
supr.a, the following language appears : 
"In his argument on the point whether the 
ordinance here in review bears any real or sub-
stantial relation to the public health, mor.als, 
safety or general welfare (which it is admitte·d is 
the test to be applied to this inquiry), petitioner 
fails to discriminate between two classes of cases, 
one of which deals with ordinances which prohibit 
entirely lawful businesses and occupations and 
the other of which seeks only to regulate such 
businesses. Cases such as People v. Hawley, 207 
Cal. 395, 279 P. 136; Pacific Rys Advertising Co. 
v. Oakland, 98 Cal. App. 165, 276 P. 629, and 
others of like tenor cited by petitioner, either ex-
pressly or in effect prohibit entirely the lawful 
businesses or occupations under consideration 
therein. In the case now before us, regulation, 
not prohibition, is decreed by the ordinance. The 
games are proscribed only in places of business 
or in any other 'place of public re_sort,' and ex-
ception is made of the amusement zones described 
in another Long Beach ordinance. In other words, 
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'pin ball' and ·other games denominated in the 
ordinance may be maintained at private houses or 
in certain delineated amusement zones, but not 
generally in places of business or public resort. 
The ordinance i~ not prohibitory but regulatory 
only, and as such is unquestionably within the 
scope and purview of the police power." 
In the case of American Fork City v. Robinson, 77 
Utah 168, 292 P. 249, an ordinance only regulating use 
by club members of billiard and pool tables was held 
invalid. Several major distinguishing features exists in 
the case no-vv before the court. In the American Fork 
case the opinion sp·ecifically notes that an ordinance 
existed prohibiting "the keeping for use in any p1.tblic 
place in the city any billiard or pool table.'' (Emphasis 
added.) This particular ordinance was not attacked 
in the case and by inference and express language it 
is recognized that a prohibition in places of public re.sort 
is within the po,ver conferred upon a municipality by 
the Legislature. In this regard, it is iluportant to note 
that the ordinance of Salt Lake City suppresses the pin 
ball machines and other siinilar devices in places of 
public resort and in those business establisluuents \Yhere 
\vithout ",.arrant the right of direct police inspection 
Pxi~t~. lienee, under the A.1nerican Fork decision the 
provi~ions of the Salt Lake (--.ity ordinance suppressing 
thP n1achinrs in places of public resort cannot be Yalidly 
nt t ackPd. 
1\dntitt<~dly, included in the Salt Lake City ordinance 
h~ thr ph ra~P "or in n.ny place of business, club, associa-
tion, or estahlislunent \vhrre \Yithout \rarrant the right. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
19· 
of direct police inspection exists" which covers establish-
ments sirnilar to those involved in the American Fork 
decision. However, the court held the ordinance invalid 
because it purported to regulate the sole subject of use; 
by club members and "did not deal with the subject 
of keeping billiard or pool tables . . ." The Supreme 
Court recognized that the ordinance would have been 
v.alid if it had included the power of regulation and 
suppression in keeping the billiard and pool tables, which 
is precisely what SaLt Lake City has done with respect 
to pin ball machines. It is stated in the ca.se as follows: 
"Part of the ordinance in question does not deal with the 
subject of keeping billiard or pool tables .... " 
Additionally the foregoing cases h.ave outlined the 
evils \vhich the ordinance is designed to extirpate. More 
compelling reasons exist for the supre.ssion of pin ball 
machines than those supporting the ban on billiard or 
pool tables in the American Fork ease, .and hence, restric-
tion of pin ball machines under the power to "improve 
the morals, peace and good order . . . of the city .and 
the inhabitants thereof ... " is proper and valid. 
In other words, the American Fork ordinance was 
not sufficiently broad to qualify under the enabling act 
since the restriction concerned only the use of the tables, 
and hence, the ordinance purported only to control the 
conduct of club members and not their conduct in rela~ 
tion to devices \Vhich had been validly prohibited under 
the enabling act. This is the only reasonable interpreta-
tion of the case and is consistent with the unanimous body 
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of judicial authority supporting the prohibition of pin 
ball game.s. 
We must conclude, therefore, that the .American 
Fork case stands as authority for the position taken by 
Salt Lake City in enacting the ordinance in question. 
The phrase "place of public resort'' as used in the 
ordinance now before the court means a place resorted 
to by the public for the use of the designated machines, 
Shaw v. Carpenter, 54 Vt. 155, 161, 41 Am. Rep. 837. 
The phrase does not include private businesses where the 
public does not resort for the use of the machines. 
Harvey, Inc. v. Sissle, 53 Ohio App. 405, 5 N.E. 2d 410. 
Nor by very definition does the phrase include any other 
private home or establishment. The machines may be 
warehoused, sold, repaired and used. It is only the scope 
of the possession and use which is restrained. 
The test is whether the general public has con1111on 
use of the 1nachines, is allo,ved to enter and play the 
machines 'vithout special invitation, and Ina~~ come and 
go without restraint. Ballentine La"~ Dictionary, Ser.-
ond Ed., page 10-±G ~ 24 An1. J ur. ±lS. 
The .sole exception to the suppression of the nla-
chinr~ only in plaees of public resort is in thos.e places 
'',vhPre \\·ithout \\·arrant n right of direct police inspection 
0Xi~t ~. H rrhis t'Xel'ption is coyered by the right of police 
offiePrs to <'Hh\r elubroo1ns of non profit corporations, 
as .sP{ l'orth in l Tt ah Codt' ... ~\nnotated~ 1953, Title 16-6-1-±. 
It is in tlH'S<' so-eallt'd priYate clubs "There the evils 
<·reatP<l hy ntnchinl'S nrc· 1nagnified. 
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Hence, a broad segment of our society remains un-
affected by the ordinance which covers only the ques·tion 
of public morals as such, and amount.s only to a sup-
pression rather than an outright prohibition of posses-
sion and use of the machines. 
That the Legisl~ature intended to gr.ant cities sub .. 
stantial powers of suppression is clearly shown by 
analogy to the enabling statutes for counties of the state 
vvhere the power is included completely to prohibit the 
possession and use of the machines. 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, Title 17-5-27 provides as 
follows: 
" ... they may license, tax, regulate, suppress 
and prohibit billiard, bagatelle, pigeonhole, or any 
other tables or implements kept or used for simi-
lar purposes ; . . ." (Empha.sis added.) 
It is inconceivable that the Legislature intended to 
grant broad powers of prohibition to counties without 
granting to cities substantial powers of suppression. 
Actually, the ter1ns "prohibit" .and "suppress" are virtu-
ally synonomous. Schwuchow v. City of Chicago, 68 Ill.. 
444. "Supress" means to prevent, put down or end by 
force. Ogden v. City of Madison, 111 Wis. 413, 87 N.W. 
568, 569. The word "suppress" is equivalent to prohibit, 
put down or end by force. State v. Mu.stachia, 152 La. 
821, 94 So. 408. 
The word "suppre.ss" is defined in Webster's New 
International Dictionary, Second Edition, 1934, as 
follows: 
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" 'Suppress' - to put down or out of exist-
ence by authority, force or pressure; to quell; to 
crush; to subdue; to force inrto impotence or ob-
scurity; to extinguish by prohibiting, dissolving, 
etc.; as, to suppress a revolt, a religious order, or 
freedom of speech. To keep from public knowl-
edge ; as (a) to refrain from divulging; to leave 
undisclosed; as, to suppress all names in an ac-
count of a scandal. (b) to prohibit or interdict 
the publication or revelntion of; to withhold from 
circulation; as, to suppress the truth, a rumor or a 
book." 
In any .event the ordinance of Salt Lake City .amounts 
only to a suppression of the machines as the case of Ex 
Parte Lau;rence, supra, makes abundantly clear. The 
effect is not, as stated by the lower court, an absolute 
prohibition. The scope of the ordinance is shown by the 
foregoing analysis. To say, as inferred by the lower court 
in its decision, that the ordinance would be valid had use 
of the machines been .allo"~ed in public an1u.sen1ent parks, 
amounts to the court acting as a superior legisla.ti'e body 
completely ignoring the intent of the Legislature to grant 
cities broad po,vers of suppres.sion of the subject 
maehines. 
Thr Utah ease of ~Tasfell r. Ogden City, 249 P. 2d 
!l07 is enti re]~T consistent "Tith the subject ordinance now 
hrfor<.' the court. The po"Ter to pass the ordinanee is 
g-ran h'd by (\Xpres.s "Tords or at the very least is neces-
Rarily jn1plied. Salt Lake C£ty 'V. Rereuu,e, 101 Utah 504, 
12~ P. ~d 5:37. ''Te contend tltat the ordinance is a valid 
PX<'rri ~r of t.lH' polirP po,rer, in har1nony ''ith the enabl-
ing- statnh's, nnd et'rtainly the Nas.fell ease is authority 
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only for situations where cities have exceeded granted 
powers. The language of Justice Crockett in the dis.sent-
ing opinion bears emphasis, as follows: 
"I expressly agree with Mr. Chief Justice 
Wolfe's statement, 'some of our holdings we have 
too narrowly construed the granted powers.' No 
better examples of this could be pointed out than 
those cited in the prevailing opinion. Narrow to 
the point of being unreasonable (as it seems to 
me) are the holdings : that to regulate and sup-
press billiard tables did not authorize an ordi-
nance prohibiting billiard playing .. ."' (American 
Fork City v. Robinson, 77 Utah 168, 292 P. 249). 
In ,2 Sutherland Statutory Construction at page 326, 
the universal rule is recognized that every presumption 
favor.s the validity of an act of the Legislative body. And 
so in the case of Price v. Tuttle, 70 Utah 156, 258 P. 1016, 
the Utah Supreme Court recognized the duty of the 
courts to construe a statute and consider not only the 
language of the act, hut also the purpose and objects 
sought by the Legislative body. 
CONCLUSION 
The authorities are uniformly consistent in holding 
that a suppression of pin ball machine.s and other similar 
devises is a valid exercise of the police power. The appar-
ent evils have been listed and discussed throughout the 
decisions, and the evils created by the p-revalence of the 
devices and the resulting injury to public morals and 
welfare have been treated by the Legislature in granting 
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to cities the power to suppress the machines. Scope of 
the suppression is not a valid subject for judicial inquiry. 
The lower court's decision is, therefore, an unwarranted 
interference with the legislative proce.ss and should be 
reversed. 
E. R. CHRISTENSEN 
City Attorney 
DONALD B. HOLBROOK 
Assistant City Attorney 
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